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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the role of a physical
watermarking signal in quickest detection of a deception attack
in a scalar linear control system where the sensor measurements
can be replaced by an arbitrary stationary signal generated by
an attacker. By adding a random watermarking signal to the
control action, the controller designs a sequential test based on
a Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method that accumulates the log-
likelihood ratio of the joint distribution of the residue and the
watermarking signal (under attack) and the joint distribution of
the innovations and the watermarking signal under no attack.
As the average detection delay in such tests is asymptotically (as
the false alarm rate goes to zero) upper bounded by a quantity
inversely proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence(KLD)
measure between the two joint distributions mentioned above,
we analyze the effect of the watermarking signal variance on the
above KLD. We also analyze the increase in the LQG control
cost due to the watermarking signal, and show that there is a
tradeoff between quick detection of attacks and the penalty in the
control cost. It is shown that by considering a sequential detection
test based on the joint distributions of residue/innovations and
the watermarking signal, as opposed to the distributions of the
residue/innovations only, we can achieve a higher KLD, thus
resulting in a reduced average detection delay. Numerical results
are provided to support our claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPS) can affect the in-
tegrity, availability and confidentiality in CPS. Examples range
from deception based attacks such as false-data-injection [1],
sensor and actuator attacks, replay attacks, and also denial of
service attacks [2] on the underlying networked control system
(NCS). Deception attacks refer to scenarios where integrity of
control packets or measurements are compromised by altering
the behaviour of sensors and actuators. In particular, false
data injection attacks are introduced by injecting incorrect
or misleading measurements or control inputs. Replay attacks
are carried out by hijacking the sensors, recording the sensor
measurements for a period of time, and then repeating such
measurements to the controller while injecting a harmful
exogenous signal into the system. On the other hand, denial
of service attacks can be carried out by an adversary com-
promising the availability of resources to the CPS, e.g., by
jamming the communication channel. Documented defence
mechanisms can range from attack identification and detec-
tion, intrusion detection as well as physical watermarking of
valid control signals. Most of these defence mechanisms have
been developed to tackle specific types of attacks, whereas a
The authors are with the Division of Signals and Systems,
Uppsala University, Box 534, Uppsala, SE-75121, Sweden (e-mail:
subhrakanti.dey@signal.uu.se)
generalized unified approach for attack identification and de-
tection is developed by adopting a descriptor system modelling
framework for CPS [3] and applications illustrated for power
and water networks. Linear state estimation with corrupted
measurements has been also studied in [4] where the maximum
number of faulty sensors is characterized and a decoding
algorithm for detecting corrupted measurements is presented.
The defence mechanism of relevance to this paper is the
idea of physical watermarking of control signals. Traditionally,
digital watermarking has been used extensively in audio and
image processing for authentication purposes, where a specific
signal is embedded in the transmitted message/document, and
is later used to identify the rightful owner of the message.
The idea of physical watermarking in NCS is similar, where a
random signal is added to the control signal, and under normal
operations, the effect of this watermarking signal should be
present in the system output. However, when the system
is attacked or compromised and sensor measurements are
substituted by injection of false data, the expected effect of the
watermarking signal will be absent or perturbed, thus leading
to a statistical test which can detect the presence of an attacker.
Two most recent works that deal with design and analysis of
physical watermarking for NCS are [2] and [9]. In [2], the
authors consider a linear state space model under a replay
attack, and design an optimal watermarking signal (added
to the true control signal) which maximizes the Kullback-
Leibler Divergence (KLD) measure between the densities of
the residual before and after the attack, subject to a constraint
on the loss of linear quadratic (LQ) control cost due to the
addition of the watermarking signal. A typical χ2 - failure
detector is used to detect an attack when a watermarking
signal is added. In [9], the authors proposed a model where
the attacker also replaces the sensor measurements by its own
simulated signal, which tries to mimic the nominal system
without the knowledge of the watermarking signal in the
control input. The key result in [9] develops two tests at the
actuator that the attacker has to pass to remain stealthy, but
this is only possible if the attacker replaces the true sensor
outputs by a signal of zero average energy.
In detecting attacks in CPS, it is of paramount impor-
tance that attack detection happens with minimum delay,
thus favouring quickest sequential detection based methods.
The watermark design techniques employed in [2], [9] are
not designed specifically for this purpose, and the statistical
detection tests developed in [9] are asymptotic in nature, thus
relying on collecting a large number of system outputs in
practice. In this paper, we will therefore focus on design and
analysis of physical watermarking signals that minimize the
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average detection delay in sequential detection methods, while
still keeping the system performance within a prescribed safety
limit - as demanded by resilience requirements of CPS under
attacks [5].
In particular, we consider a scalar networked linear control
system, where the attacker launches a deception attack at a
certain unknown but deterministic time point, by injecting a
false measurement sequence that replaces the true sensor mea-
surements. The estimator/controller employs standard optimal
linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control based on the received
measurement sequence without knowing whether there has
been an attack or not. In order to aid the detection of the
attacker, which on the other hand tries to remain stealthy, the
controller adds a random watermarking signal to the control
signal, which is only known to the controller/actuator, and not
the adversary. Furthermore, the controller employs a sequential
detection test based on the cumulative sum (CUSUM) algo-
rithm that is well known to minimize the average detection
delay under a constraint on the mean time between false
alarms. This sequential test is based on the log-likelihood ratio
of the joint distribution of the residue (measurement prediction
error) and the watermarking signal before and after the attack.
Since an asymptotic (as the false alarm rate goes to zero) upper
bound on the average detection delay is inversely proportional
to the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) measure between
these joint distributions before and after the attack, we analyze
the behaviour of the KLD measure with respect to the variance
of the watermarking signal. While increasing the watermarking
signal variance increases the KLD, it also increases the corre-
sponding LQG control cost. The behaviour of the increase
in the control cost due to the watermarking signal is also
analyzed, illustrating the tradeoff between quickest detection,
and the penalty in the control cost. Unlike previous works
which consider KLD between the distributions of the residue
signal (under attack) and the innovations (before the attack)
only, we show that by considering the joint distributions of
the residue/innovation and the watermarking signal, we can
increase the KLD even further, thus reducing the average
detection delay. Numerical results confirm our findings.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A. System model
We consider the following architecture of a networked control
system. The single-input single-output, linear time invariant
system is modeled as:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk (1)
in which xk ∈ R is the state variable and uk ∈ R is the control
input at time k generated by the controller. wk ∈ R ∼ N (0, Q)
is the process noise at time k which is assumed to be an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random process.
A sensor reports its (scalar) observations to the controller in
the following form at time k:
yk = Cxk + vk (2)
in which vk ∼ N (0, R) is i.i.d. measurement noise that is
independent of the process noise wk. Note that although we
consider a scalar state-space system, we still use uppercase
letters for the system parameters A,B,C,Q,R, with a slight
abuse of notation. We assume that the system has started
at time t = −∞ and currently is in steady-state condition,
as stabilizability and detectability are guaranteed for a scalar
system. Then the optimal state estimate equations, based on
Kalman filtering, are given as
xˆk+1|k = Axˆk|k +Buk (3)
xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 +Kγk (4)
where xˆk+1|k = E[xk+1|Yk], and xˆk|k = E[xk|Yk] are
the Kalman predicted and filtered state estimate, respectively
based on received measurements up to time k, given by Yk.
Also,
K =
CP
C2P +R
(5)
is the steady-state Kalman gain and where P is the steady-
state minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) estimation error
variance E(xk − xˆk|k−1)2 obtained from the solution to the
algebraic Riccati equation
P = A2P +Q−A2C2P 2(C2P +R)−1. (6)
In (4) the innovation sequence γk is the defined as
γk , yk − Cxˆk|k−1. (7)
We assume that the sensor is connected to the estima-
tor/controller via a link that is susceptible to malicious attacks.
In the system equation (1), the control signal uk is sent by
the controller (which is assumed to be co-located with the
actuator), to the sensor as a linear function of the filtered
state estimate, such that uk = f(xˆk−∞) minimizes the infinite-
horizon LQG cost:
J = lim
T→∞
E
1
2T + 1
[
T∑
k=−T
(Wx2k + Uu
2
k)] (8)
where W and U are positive weights. The LQG control policy
results in a fixed-gain linear control signal as
uk = Lxˆk|k (9)
in which L is given by
L =
−ABS
B2S + U
(10)
and S is the solution obtained from the algebraic Riccati
equation
S = A2S +W −A2B2S2(B2S + U)−1. (11)
B. Attack model
We assume that the adversary can launch an attack against
the integrity of the sensor measurements such that the estima-
tor/controller, instead of receiving the true measurement, yk
sent by the honest sensor, receives zk, which is injected by
the attacker. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker knows
the system parameters A,B,C,Q and R and also the control
policy, i.e., L but not necessarily the true sensor measurements
yk. On the other hand, we assume that the control signal is
not tampered with by the adversary.
The goal of the attacker is to change the performance of the
control system by sending fake observations, zk, that replaces
the true ones and while doing so remain undetected. In the
general form of the attack, we assume that the attack is injected
into the system at time k, i.e., instead of [yk, yk+1, yk+2, ...],
[zk, zk+1, zk+2, ...] is received by the controller. It is easy to
show that if the attacker only modifies the sensor measurement
at time k, and left the subsequent measurements undisturbed,
or modifies the sensor measurements only after sufficiently
long intervals, the attacker can remain undetected as the dif-
ference between the true innovations and the false innovations
based on the altered measurement sequence will go to zero
exponentially fast. On the other hand, the effect of the attack
at one single point in time will also be forgotten exponentially
due to stabilizability and detectability properties of the control
system which are automatic for the scalar case when the
optimal Kalman filter and LQG controller are applied. This
is obviously not useful from the attacker’s point of view.
Hence, in the following section, we consider an attack model
where the attacker continuously replaces the true measurement
ym by a fake measurement zm for all m ≥ k. This is a
kind of spoofing attack which can be accomplished by the
adversary, even without having access to yk itself, by jamming
or overpowering the true sensor signal if sent over wireless.
However, if the sensor signal is not sent over wireless the
adversary might be able to hijack it in another way and
replacing the yk with zk in a so called man-in-the-middle
attack. Most protocols used today would not be able to detect
such an attack. Nevertheless, the objective of the attacker is
to remain stealthy for a sufficiently long period of time over
which the attack takes place, to cause maximum damage to
the control system.
In this paper, we will assume that the attacker does not
need to know the true sensor measurements but can simply
alter them by injecting (as we will assume for the rest of this
paper) the sequence {zk}, which is stationary with statistics
E(z2k) = σ
2
z , (12)
E(zk, zk−k′) = ρk
′
σ2z (13)
in which ρ < 1. Depending on whether the attacker physically
compromises the sensor node or simply replaces the sensor
measurements by injecting a strong interfering signal, it may
also need to know the encryption algorithm used by the
networked control system. However, it is common to assume
that the adversary has full knowledge of all system parameters
and protocols, as is often done in cryptography according
to the notion of “security through obscurity” known as Ker-
ckhoffs’s principle, or also according to Shannon’s maxim,
which essentially assumes that “the enemy knows the system.”
Knowing the system is a sensible assumption since then the
adversary can cause maximum damage, a situation that is
essential to detect as fast as possible.
C. Attack stealthiness
To determine whether an attack is present in the control
system or not we shall rely on a hypothesis testing procedure
based on the following two hypotheses:
H0: No attack (the controller receives the true sequence yk)
H1: Attack (the controller receives the false sequence zk)
Let pFk represent the false alarm probability, i.e., deciding
H1 when H0 is true and let pDk represent the detection
probability, i.e., deciding H1 when H1 is true, at time k. Fur-
thermore, define γ˜k to be the innovation signal zk−CxˆFk|k−1,
where xˆFk|k−1 is the inaccurate Kalman predictor designed
in the presence of an attack based on the received sequence
{zk}. Let γ˜k1 and γk1 represent the sequences {γ˜j}kj=1 {γj}kj=1,
respectively. The goal is to design a detector which, with high
probability can detect an attack while keeping the false alarm
probability as small as possible. It is common to design a
hypothesis testing procedure that decides in favour of H0 or
H1 based on testing the innovation sequence γ˜k1 (under attack)
and the true innovation sequence γk1 .
In detection theory, the performance of the detector can be
characterized by the trade-off between pFk and p
D
k . Following
[6], [7], we introduce the following definition of a stealthy
attack:
Definition 1: For  > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, an attack is -
stealthy if for any detector that satisfies 0 < 1 − pDk ≤ δ, it
holds that
lim sup
k→∞
−1
k
log(pFk ) ≤  (14)
It was shown in [7] that condition (14) is equivalent to
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
D(fγ˜k‖fγk) ≤  (15)
when the hypothesis H0 for no attack assumes the innovation
sequence γk1 , and the residues γ˜
k
1 for H1. Here, D(fγ˜k‖fγk)
is the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) between the se-
quences γ˜k1 and γ
k
1 defined as:
D(fγ˜‖fγ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fγ˜(γ
k
1 ) log
fγ˜(γ
k
1 )
fγ(γk1 )
dγk1 . (16)
where fγ˜ , fγ are the (stationary) distributions of the sequences
{γ˜k} and {γk}, respectively. Clearly, for a given  designed by
the attacker, the objective for the control system designer is to
detect the attacker, and hence increase the value of the quantity
D = lim supk→∞
1
kD(fγ˜k‖fγk), an expression for which was
provided in [7]. This leads us to the next section, where we
employ a physical watermarking mechanism to increase an
appropriate KLD measure based on the joint distributions of
the innovations/residues and the random watermarking signal,
thus making it difficult for the attacker to remain undetected
through a sequential detection test designed accordingly. Note
that we do not discuss how the adversary designs  in response
to the sequential detection test employed by the control
system designer in this paper, a topic which will be further
investigated in a game theoretic setting in future work.
D. Defence mechanism based on physical watermarking
As explained above, the attacker can choose an intelligent
policy to inject false observations and tries to remain unde-
tected. This however relies on the the fact that the control
system is influenced by process and measurement noises,
which produce uncertainty in favour of the attacker.
To protect the system against these active attacks, a key
idea is to add a random watermarking signal, known only by
the controller (and not to the attacker, although the attacker
may know the statistics of the watermarking signal), to the
control sequence uk. In particular, the controller adds the
watermarking sequence ek to the control signal, i.e.,
uk = Lxˆk + ek (17)
where ek is assumed to be an i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian
sequence with variance σ2e . The idea of adding such a physical
watermarking signal was proposed in [2] in the context of
detecting replay attacks, and further extended and analyzed in
the context of dynamic watermarking in [9]. In general, the
signal ek can be a stationary Gauss-Markov process as shown
in [2], although for the purpose of this paper, we assume it to
be i.i.d.
By adding this sequence the controller is provided with a
tool to check if the received signal from the sensors bear
any correlation with the watermarking sequence or not. If
the attacker injects a false observation zk, which is naturally
independent of the watermarking signal, then this can be
detected by the controller, even though the attacker may know
the statistics of the watermarking signal.
In [2], a χ2 failure detector based on the residue vector
(which is either γk or γ˜k) was suggested for detecting an
attack, whereas in [9], two asymptotic tests were proposed to
detect an attack. Both of these schemes require a sufficiently
large number of samples to be used for the test in practice
to achieve a good detection probability with a constraint on
the false alarm rate. It is of course, of utmost importance
to detect an attack as soon as possible, and this motivates
us to consider a non-Bayesian sequential detection method
under the assumption that the attack takes place at a fixed
but unknown point of time. In particular, the cumulative-sum
(CUSUM) method which minimizes the average detection
delay subject to a constraint on the mean time between
false alarms, also known as Lorden’s method [10]. However,
instead of comparing directly the distribution of γk and γ˜k,
we propose a detection mechanism as follows. The controller,
upon receiving the observation yk (which is not known to be
the true yk or the false zk) calculates γk (or γ˜k )and computes
Sk = max(0, Sk−1 + log
fγ˜k,ek−1(γ˜k, ek−1)
fγk,ek−1(γ˜k, ek−1)
) . (18)
where fγ˜k,ek−1 and fγk,ek−1 denote the joint distribution
between the residue signal and the watermarking signal. The
controller then decides on “attack” or “no attack” based on
the following policy:
The system is under attack if Sk > α,
The system is not under attack if Sk < α (19)
where α , | log pF | .
The above policy can be justified in the way that if the
received observation by the controller is the true one, then
γk = yk − Cxˆk|k−1
= Cxk + vk − C(A+BL)xˆk−1|k−1 − CBek−1
= CA(xk−1 − xˆk−1|k−1) + Cwk−1 + vk . (20)
meaning that γk is uncorrelated with the watermarking
signal ek−1. On the contrary, if the received observation by
the controller is the false zk, then
γ˜k = zk − CxˆFk|k−1
= zk − C(A+BL)xˆFk−1|k−1 − CBek−1. (21)
Thus, it is evident that the false innovations γ˜k is correlated
with watermarking signal ek−1 and we can conclude that the
control system is under attack.
It is worth mentioning that one might be tempted to conduct
a sequential test based on the log-likelihood ratio log
fγ˜k (γ˜k)
fγk (γk)
(i.e, based on the log-likelihood ratio of the distributions
of the residue under attack and innovations (no attack)),
instead of Sk defined in (18), which is based on the joint
distributions of the residue/innovations and the watermarking
signal. In the following sections, we will illustrate how our
suggested test quantity Sk can reduce the average detection
delay as opposed to using the log-likelihood ratio based on
the residue/innovations only, as mentioned above.
III. MAIN RESULTS
To analyze our suggested detection approach further we
will use the Average Detection Delay (ADD) as a measure
to quantify performance. It is well known that [8], [10] when
the observations before and after the change are i.i.d, it is
shown that, as the mean time between false alarms goes to
infinity (or false alarm rate pF goes to zero) the ADD is
asymptotically upper bounded by | log p
F |
I1
where I1 corre-
sponds to the KLD between the distributions after and before
the change. Although originally derived for i.i.d. sequences,
these asymptotic upper bound results have been extended to
the case of dependent but stationary sequences in [11], which
allows to write the following asymptotic upper bound on the
ADD for the proposed sequential test based on (18), (19):
| log pF |
D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1)
. (22)
Clearly, for a fixed pF , the upper bound on the ADD is
inversely proportional to the KLD between the joint distribu-
tions before and after the attack. In the following theorem, we
obtain an expression for D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) corresponding
to our proposed detection approach.
Theorem 1: Consider the joint distributions between the
watermarking signal and the true and false innovations, re-
spectively, i.e., fγk,ek−1 and fγ˜k,ek−1 . The KLD between these
joint distributions, D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1), is then given by:
D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) =
1
2
log(
1
1− λ2 )
+
1
2
(
σ2γ˜
σ2γ
− 1− log σ
2
γ˜
σ2γ
) (23)
in which
λ =
−BCσe
σγ˜
(24)
σ2γ˜ = [(1−
ρCK(A+BL)
1− ρA )
2
+
(1− ρ2)C2K2(A+BL)2
(1−A2)(1− ρA)2 ]σ
2
z +
B2C2
1−A2σ
2
e (25)
σ2γ = C
2P +R (26)
where A , (1 − CK)(A + BL) (note also that A < 1
from stabilizability and detectability which is automatic for
the scalar case) and P is calculated according to (6). Finally,
|λ| < 1, as shown in the proof.
Proof: See Section V.A.
In Theorem 1, D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) is the difference
between the joint distributions between the innovations
and the watermarking signal, i.e., fγk,ek−1(γk, ek−1) and
fγ˜k,ek−1(γ˜k, ek−1), for the healthy and attacked systems, re-
spectively. With a fixed false alarm probability, we need to
make these distributions as distinguishable as possible to avoid
unnecessary detection delays. Observing the expression (23)
we note that D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) is a monotonically increas-
ing function of σ2e . Hence, an increase in the watermarking
signal power results in a decrease in the ADD due to an
increasing KLD. However, the decreased ADD comes at a
cost: by increasing the watermarking signal power we also
diverge from the optimal LQG cost given by (8), (9). Hence,
there is a tradeoff between reducing the average detection
delay and the system performance in terms of the increase of
the LQG cost. Note that it can be shown that the difference in
the LQG cost due to use of the watermarking signal is higher
for the healthy system than that of the system under attack.
Hence we elaborate on this issue in the following theorem,
by considering the difference in the LQG cost for the healthy
system (the worse of the two scenarios). See [2] for a similar
treatment.
Theorem 2: Consider the LQG cost (8) with weighting
factors W and U and let ∆LQG represent the acceptable
increase in the LQG cost from the optimal LQG cost for
the system under no attack. Then, the watermarking signal
variance is related to the increase in LQG cost as follows:
σ2e =
∆LQG
U + B
2(W+L2U)
1−(A+BL)2
(27)
Proof: See Section V.B.
Remark 1: As stated in the previous section, instead of
the distribution of the innovations in our detection policy, we
considered the joint distribution between the innovations and
the watermarking signal. The benefit of using the joint distribu-
tion instead of using the innovations only can be immediately
observed in the expression of the D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) in
(23). By considering the innovations only, the corresponding
D(fγ˜k‖fγk) expression equals the second term in (23) i.e.,
1
2 (
σ2γ˜
σ2γ
− 1 − log σ
2
γ˜
σ2γ
). By using the joint distributions we also
obtain the first term in (23), which is positive, leading to a
larger KLD, thus making it more difficult for the attacker to
remain stealthy.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we will investigate the tradeoff between ADD
and ∆LQG. This is shown in Fig. 1 for two different values of
pF = .001 and pF = .01. The blue dashed line represents the
simulated ADD according to our detection policy in (19) while
the solid pink line shows the ADD upper bound according
to our result in Theorem 1. The red dash-dot line shows the
ADD upper bound for the detection policy based on the KLD
between the distributions of the residue signal (under attack)
and the true innovations (no attack). This is referred to in the
graphs as “ADD bound based on innovations only”. It should
be noted that in previous works such as [9], some numerical
results based on a sequential detection are presented, although
the actual detection policy is not clearly stated. The results in
Fig. 1 are depicted for the values A = .7, B = C = R =
Q = W = 1, U = .4, σ2z = 4, ρ = .5 and the real ADD blue
dashed line is calculated based on the average over 100 random
realizations of the sequential detection algorithm. Comparison
between the solid pink line and the red dash-dot line in Fig.
1 demonstrates the reduction in the ADD upper bounds due
to using our proposed sequential detection test compared to a
sequential detection based on innovations/residues only.
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Fig. 1. ADD in terms of ∆LQG for pF = .001 and pF = .01
In Fig. 2 we investigate the effect of different values of σ2z
and ρ for fixed value of the parameters A = .7, B = C =
R = Q = W = 1, U = .4, pF = .01. Intuitively, ADD
is a decreasing function of σ2z and an increasing function
of ρ. This conforms with the theoretical analysis of the
D(fγ˜k‖fγk) in (23) in which
∂D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1 )
∂σ2z
> 0 and
∂D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1 )
∂ρ < 0.
Fig. 3 illustrates the ADD for an unstable system with A >
1. The ADD is shown in two different setup for A = 1.2 while
B,C,R,Q,W,U, pF are the same as in Fig. 2. Comparing the
corresponding diagrams, i.e., the same σ2z and ρ in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3, it is seen that in the unstable case with A > 1, there
exists a higher gap between the ADD bounds for the sequential
tests based on the joint distribution as proposed in this paper
and the one based on innovations/residues only.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated how a suitably designed
sequential detection test can detect deception attacks in a scalar
networked control system with an average detection delay
that can be reduced by introducing a physical watermarking
signal with a suitable variance. The tradeoff between quick
detection and penalty in the control cost as a result of using
the watermarking signal is also investigated. Future works
will extend these results to multi-variable (vector state and
measurements) systems, and propose a dynamic game between
the adversary and the control system designer regarding the
attacker’s effort to remain stealthy, and the system designer’s
effort to detect the attack with minimum delay, using such
physical watermarking schemes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
To calculate D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1), we need to obtain the
joint distributions fγk,ek−1(γ, e) and fγ˜k,ek−1(γ, e) in steady
state. As it was shown in (20), in the healthy system, γk and
ek−1 are uncorrelated for i.i.d. watermarking sequence. Hence
the joint distribution fγkek−1(γ, e) appears as:
fγkek−1(γ, e) =
1
2piσγσe
exp
−1
2
(
γ2
σ2γ
+
e2
σ2e
) (28)
in which σ2γ is given as in (26). On the other hand, when
we have attack, γ˜k and ek−1 are correlated according to (21).
Since γ˜k and ek−1 are zero-mean Gaussian, to obtain their
joint distribution, we need to calculate σ2γ˜ and cov(γ˜k, ek−1).
Since ek−1 is uncorrelated with zk and xˆFk−1|k−1, we use (21)
to obtain:
cov(γ˜k, ek−1) = −CBσ2e (29)
Using the same equation, we have:
σ2γ˜ = σ
2
z + C
2(A+BL)2σ2xˆ
− 2C(A+BL)cov(zk, xˆFk−1|k−1) + C2B2σ2e . (30)
where σ2xˆ = E
(
xˆFk−1|k−1
)2
.
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Fig. 2. ADD in terms of ∆LQG for different values of σ2z and ρ
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Fig. 3. ADD in terms of ∆LQG for different values of σ2z and ρ with
A = 1.2
To calculate cov(zk, xˆFk−1|k−1) we proceed as follows. By
combining (4) and (7), for the attacked system, one obtains:
xˆFk−1|k−1 = Kzk−1 +AxˆFk−2|k−2 +B(1− CK)ek−2. (31)
By multiplying the above equation with zk and calculating
expectation of the both sides for the stationary system, and
defining Exˆz(−l) = cov(zk, xˆFk−l|k−l), we have:
Exˆz(−1) = KEzz(1) +AExˆz(−2).
Continuing the same procedure for zk+1, zk+2, ..., one obtains:
Exˆz(−2) = KEzz(2) +AExˆz(−3)
Exˆz(−3) = KEzz(3) +AExˆz(−4)
.
.
.
in which Ezz(k) is obtained according to (13).
Since A < 1 and ρ < 1, Exˆz(−1) is obtained as a sum of
an infinite geometric series which converges to:
Exˆz(−1) = Kσ2z
∞∑
i=1
ρiAi−1
= Kσ2zρ
∞∑
i=0
(ρA)i
=
Kσ2zρ
1−ρA (32)
To calculate σ2xˆ, we reuse (31) such that:
E(xˆFk−1|k−1)
2 = K2E(z2k−1) +A2E(xˆFk−2|k−2)2
+ 2KAE(zk−1xˆFk−2|k−2) +B2(1− CK)2σ2e
(33)
which results in:
σ2xˆ = K
2σ2z+A2σ2xˆ+2KAExˆz(−1)+B2(1−CK)2σ2e . (34)
Combing (32) and (34) yields:
σ2xˆ =
K2(1 + ρA)
(1− ρA)(1−A2)σ
2
z +
B2(1− CK)2
1−A2 σ
2
e . (35)
and eventually, using (30), σ2γ˜ is obtained as:
σ2γ˜ = [(1− ρCK(A+BL)1−ρA )2 + (1−ρ
2)C2K2(A+BL)2
(1−A2)(1−ρA)2 ]σ
2
z
+B
2C2
1−A2σ
2
e
To obtain the joint distribution fγ˜kek−1(γ, e), we form the
cross-covariance matrix of γk.ek−1 as:
Σ =
(
σ2γ˜ −CBσ2e
−CBσ2e σ2e
)
(36)
and consequently:
fγ˜k,ek−1(γ, e) =
1
2piσγ˜σe
√
1− λ2
× exp
{
−1
2(1− λ2)
(
γ2
σ2γ˜
+
e2
σ2e
− 2λeγ
σeσγ˜
)}
(37)
in which
λ =
cov(γ˜k, ek−1)
σeσγ˜
(a)
=
−BCσe
σγ˜
(38)
where (a) is deduced from (29). Note also that |λ| < 1 as it
is a correlation coefficient.
Then D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) is calculated as:∫∫ ∞
−∞
fγ˜kek−1(γ, e) log
fγ˜k,ek−1(γ, e)
fγk,ek−1(γ, e)
)dedγ. (39)
Replacing the joint distributions as in (28) and (37) in (39)
yields
D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1) = log(
σγ
σγ˜
√
1− λ2 )
+
−σ2γ˜
2
(
1
(1− λ2)σ2γ˜
− 1
σ2γ
) +
−1
2
(
1
(1− λ2) − 1)
+
λcov(γ˜k, ek−1)
(1− λ2)σγ˜σe
= log(
σγ
σγ˜
√
1− λ2 ) +
−σ2γ˜
2
(
1
(1− λ2)σ2γ˜
− 1
σ2γ
)
+
−1
2
(
1
(1− λ2) − 1) +
λ2
(1− λ2)
= log(
σγ
σγ˜
√
1− λ2 ) +
σ2γ˜
2σ2γ
− 1
2
=
1
2
log(
1
1− λ2 ) +
1
2
(
σ2γ˜
σ2γ
− 1− log σ
2
γ˜
σ2γ
)
Using the same approach as in [7], it can be shown that the av-
eraged KLD is equal to the single letter D(fγ˜k,ek−1‖fγk,ek−1)
calculated above in which the distributions are the steady state
ones.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To calculate the cost of using the watermarking for the
purpose of detection, we obtain the difference of LQGs
between the cases depending on whether watermarking is used
or not used in the healthy system. According to (8), we use
(17) to obtain:
∆LQG = Jw − Jn =
W (E(X2w)−E(X2n))+UL2(E(Xˆ2w)−E(Xˆ2n))+Uσ2e (40)
where subscript ’w’ refers to the case where we use water-
marking and subscript ’n’ refers to the case that we don’t
use watermarking. To calculate ∆LQG, we need to calculate
E(X2w) and E(Xˆ
2
w). Based on the fact that γk is uncorrelated
with xˆk|k−1, we use (4) in steady-state condition to obtain:
E(Xˆ2w) = (A+BL)
2E(Xˆ2w) +B
2σ2e +K
2σ2γ
= (A+BL)2E(Xˆ2w) +B
2σ2e +K
2(C2P +R)
which yields
E(Xˆ2w) =
1
1− (A+BL)2 (B
2σ2e +K
2(C2P +R)) (41)
To calculate E(X2w), (7) is obtained as:
E(Y 2w) = σ
2
γ + C
2((A+BL)2E(Xˆ2w) +B
2σ2e)
= (C2P +R)(1 + C
2K2(A+BL)2
1−(A+BL)2 ) +
B2C2
1−(A+BL)2σ
2
e) (42)
where we used (41) to conclude (42).
Then (2) is used to calculate E(X2w) as
E(X2w) =
E(Y 2w)−R
C2
= P + K
2(A+BL)2(C2P+R)
1−(A+BL)2 +
B2
1−(A+BL)2σ
2
e (43)
Combining (41) and (43) with (40) gives us:
∆LQG =
(
U +
B2(W + L2U)
1− (A+BL)2
)
σ2e (44)
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